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Beyond the Other as Constitutive Outside: The Politics of Immunity in Roberto 
Esposito and Niklas Luhmann 
 
Introduction: Roberto Esposito’s Incomplete Deconstruction of the Constitutive Other 
The concept of the ‘constitutive outside’ was introduced to political theory by Ernesto Laclau 
and Chantal Mouffe1. Drawing on Henry Staten’s reading of iterative meaning formation in 
Derrida2, Laclau and Mouffe argue that in the absence of ontological grounding, identity 
constitution must take place against a “radical outside, without a common measure with the 
inside” (Laclau, 1990: 18). The ‘constitutive outside’ has since not only been widely adopted 
within Continental Political Theory (Oswell, 2006; Hall, 2000). But it also increasingly 
informs more general social theory and empirical social research in a way which is largely 
dissociated from the concept’s theoretical underpinnings, which thus remain unchallenged 
(Hawkesworth, 2010; Mara, 2003; Diez, 2004). This article unfolds its argumentation from 
the insight that this unquestioned theoretical adoption of Laclau and Mouffe’s ‘constitutive 
outside’ is highly problematic because of the political consequences they infer from its 
epistemic necessity (Laclau 1990; Mouffe 2000). Intertwined with Carl Schmitt’s (1996: 19-
27) assumption of a general political antagonism between friend and foe, the fluid, iterative 
outside of meaning constitution3 is turned into a solidified other when applied to the political 
 
1 Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy is often referred to as the origin of the ‘constitutive 
outside’  -  even by Mouffe (2000: 21) herself (Oswell, 2006: 58). Laclau and Mouffe discuss the mutually 
productive relationship between hegemony and social exclusion here, but in reference to Althusser’s reading of 
Hegelian dialectics as a general logic of social reproduction. The concept itself doesn’t actually appear in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, but only finds its way into Laclau and Mouffe’s later, separate works in 
reference to Staten’s reading of Derrida. In the former they still insist on the Marxist distinction between real 
opposition and artificial, discursive antagonism (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 97-134) which is later dissolved 
when they work out the ‘constitutive outside’ as a theoretical concept with stronger post-structuralist markings 
(Mouffe, 2000; Laclau, 1990). 
2 In Wittgenstein and Derrida, Staten (1984: 24) introduces the concept to illustrate how, for Derrida, meaning is 
always produced in relation to both its linguistic and its social context and thus cannot be understood as 
essential and unitary. For Derrida himself, the character of the ‘constitutive outside’ seems to remain 
ambiguous. It oscillates between an unspecified multiplicity which marks the linguistic realm of possibility on 
which every specification of meaning draws (Derrida, 2005: 100-5) and a more defined, personalised 
psychoanalytical other which comes into play when Derrida relates his linguistic insights to the post-
foundational constitution of subjectivity (Staten, 1984: 141-9). 
3 Derrida himself enforces the idea that his epistemological argument of a mutually constitutive relationship 
between self and outside unfolds a violent antagonism when applied to communal politics. In Rogues, he argues 
that the democratic community constitutes itself through the immunisation against “all the others, in particular 
bad citizens, rogues, noncitizens” (Derrida, 2005: 63). But since the democratic community, just as the linguistic 
sign, lacks a proper meaning as its ontological core, nothing prevents political immunisation from turning into a 
fatal state of auto-immunity which attacks the community it ought to protect (Derrida, 2005: 30-8). 
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realm. Political antagonism becomes both epistemological condition for, and political 
consequence of, every process of identity-formation (Mouffe, 2000: 21-9). 
This article turns to Roberto Esposito’s contemporary political philosophy to re-think the 
‘constitutive outside’ in its epistemic formation and its political implications. The backbone 
of Esposito’s philosophy is his deconstruction of community as an ontological essence which 
connects, unifies or delimits its members. Esposito’s communitas is an ontological “no-thing” 
(Esposito, 2010: 136). It only exists as the practical social bonds which form and maintain 
communal life in the absence of an ontological ground. The absent ground of communal life 
unfolds the conceptual trias of community, immunity and biopolitics which runs through 
Esposito’s work. He shows how communal relations which paradoxically persist against this 
foundational lack require a political mechanism of immunisation which conceals the 
community’s internal void by displacing it to the outside. However, this political mechanism 
at the same time transforms the relational communitas into a biopolitically immunised 
community which is now politically reproduced against the background of this displaced 
other (Bird and Short, 2013: 6-10).  
In close connection to the post-ontological community theories of Jean-Luc Nancy and 
Maurice Blanchot, Esposito’s powerful deconstruction of communal essence on the one hand 
opens recurring communitarian themes within political theory to the critical investigation of 
their foundation, their theoretical and ethical implications (Tierney 2016; Hole 2013; Bird 
2013). On the other hand, it provides a theoretical basis to critically explore how political 
immunisation, from the Third Reich’s biologisation of the political lexicon to the governance 
of health crises, produces a fictional community-to-be-governed against a foreign threat 
(Esposito 2008: 112-7; Pellizzoni 2011; Jaakko 2013). This article argues that Esposito’s 
unpacking of immunitarian politics takes place on the basis of a second, more implicit 
theoretical deconstruction, which so far has remained unnoticed. 
Esposito dissolves post-ontological political theories of community from the intertwinement 
with a foundational self/other dialectic. He shows that political antagonism is the contingent 
product of communal immunisation, not the ontological condition of communal life. The 
legal meaning of immunitas describes an exemption from the reciprocal exchange which 
takes place in communal relations. But while immunisation disrupts the ideal reciprocity of 
communitas, Esposito shows that the flip side of the exclusion it performs is a unifying effect 
that holds together shared social existence in practice (Esposito, 2011: 8-10). When usurped 
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by sovereign governance, communal immunisation can unfold a negative, antagonistic 
dynamic which corresponds to the biomedical meaning of immunity as the defence of a body 
(politic) against an external aggressor (Esposito, 2008: 30-49). But importantly, 
immunisation is never per se negative and destructive for Esposito. First and foremost, it is 
nothing more than the mechanism through which communal relations reproduce themselves 
against the ontological void they are based on. The biopolitics of negative immunisation 
which reproduce the community against an external other are merely a contingent, socio-
politically conditioned form of this constitutive immunisation. 
The first part of this article will illustrate how Esposito proposes affirmative immunity as an 
alternative logic to the constitutive antagonism of negative biopolitics. Affirmative or tolerant 
immunity produces communal life not against a defined, external other. On the contrary, it 
performs communal self-production through the constant, introversive oscillation between 
inclusive openness and exclusive self-differentiation. Affirmative immunisation takes place 
against the ‘constitutive outside’ of life in its Bergsonian multiplicity. This outside is not co-
constituted as antagonistic other – but primarily undifferentiated and thus undefined. On this 
basis, immunitarian politics unfolds within a continuum of multiple outside relations which 
are open to the self-differentiating political community (Campbell and Luisetti, 2010: 111-5). 
However, I argue that Esposito’s theory of immunity fails to harness its innovative potential 
for understanding the politics of indeterminate communal self-production. 
The second part of this article illustrates how Esposito essentialises and prioritises the 
becoming of biological life as source of social normativity. Through a problematic reading of 
Gilles Deleuze, he firstly reintroduces biological life as directional and constitutive 
externality to his affirmative immunity. As a consequence, this “vitalism of politics” 
(Esposito, 2008: 115) secondly leads to a depoliticisation of immunisation itself. Politics 
becomes secondary and reactive to a strengthened and unhinged bios which Esposito 
theoretically immunises against any critical investigation of its political conditions and 
consequences. The third part of this article aims to resolve the theoretical ambiguities which 
follow the organicist and vitalist notions running through Esposito’s affirmative immunity. 
To this end, I turn to a theorist whom Esposito himself employs to conceptualise immunity: 
Niklas Luhmann. Against the simplifying misreading of Niklas Luhmann as positivist-
analytical theorist, this article connects to recent attempts within Luhmann scholarship to 
highlight the multiple points of contact his Systems Theory offers for pluralist, post-
Accepted version of: Richter, H. (2016). Beyond the ‘other’ as constitutive outside: The politics of immunity in Roberto Esposito and Niklas 
Luhmann. European Journal of Political Theory, 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1177/1474885116658391 
 
ontological and especially post-structuralist theory (Devellennes, 2014; La Cour and 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2013; Opitz, 2013; Moeller, 2012; Stäheli, 2000).  
Esposito’s community and Luhmann’s social system share a functional logic. The social 
relations they consist of reproduce themselves not just in spite of, but through the lack of 
ontological grounding – a process which Luhmann refers to as autopoiesis. The immunitarian 
protection of autopoiesis does not prioritise vitalist becoming. It is radically indeterminate in 
terms of both the social relations and the epistemic content which it reproduces. To ensure the 
autopoiesis of social systemic relations, it is not a biologically connoted life force, but 
informational complexity which has to be contained through immunisation (Luhmann, 2002: 
70-159). Luhmann’s immunisation reduces complexity to allow for the continuation of social 
relations. But as in Esposito, it also reproduces the status quo of contemporary politics. 
However, since Luhmann’s political immunisation consists in the continuous inclusion of 
contradictions as points of rupture and openness, it is, in contrast to Esposito’s negative 
immunity, never completely closed off towards potential change.  
This article employs the theories of immunisation developed by Esposito and Luhmann to 
conceptualise post-ontological, communal identity constitution against a ‘constitutive 
outside’ in a way which does not automatically unfold a Schmittean antagonism when 
transferred to the political realm. The immunitarian self-production of social relations takes 
place in constant, productive exchange with the undifferentiated outside excluded at the 
limits of their capacity for epistemic connections. It can certainly take the form of a 
community which produces its unity against an external other. But this ‘other’ is nothing 
more than the contingent, politically conditioned form in which a primarily undefined outside 
is made sense of on the inside of communal relations. As a temporary, politically conditioned 
rather than epistemologically fixed path-dependency of communal self-production, any 
antagonism it institutes is always open to alteration.  
 
The Political Contingency of the Immunised Community: Communitas, Biopolitical 
Othering, Affirmative Immunity 
Esposito inserts his biopolitical theory of immunity into a moment of ambiguity he identifies 
in Foucault’s conceptualisation of biopolitical governance. Ambiguously, Foucault’s 
governance of life oscillates between succeeding and supporting the former. Esposito rejects 
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the idea that biopolitical governance marks a distinct historical phase. Instead, “bios and 
nomos, life and politics, emerge as the two constituent elements of a single, indivisible whole 
that assumes meaning from their interrelation” (Esposito, 2008: 45). It is immunity which 
comes to perform this constant interrelation of life and politics to produce the political-legal 
community in Esposito (2008: 48-50). But how does the immunised community come into 
being in the first place? In Communitas: The Origin and Destiny of Community, Esposito 
draws on the classical political theories of Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant to deconstruct the idea 
that communities can be traced back to a biological, geographical or ontological essence 
which demarcates the community as ideal space of public ownership and proper subjective 
belonging (Bird and Short, 2013: 5-6). Against this philosophical myth of the proper 
community, Esposito employs Marcel Mauss’ famous analysis of gift-giving to argue that it 
is the practice of munus which functions socially constitutive. The reciprocal obligation to 
expose subjective identity to a social other constitutes the basis of communal life (Tierney, 
2016: 61-6).  
This social mechanism of shared, reciprocal expropriation is the relational ground on which 
communitas persists – empirically, not transcendentally. But since the common munus “isn't 
having, but on the contrary, is a debt, a pledge, a gift that is to be given”, it necessarily “will 
establish a lack” (Esposito, 2010: 6). This lack is the absent ground of the community. 
Community thus does not exist beyond its manifestation in social bonds, not because it has 
lost - or yet to reach - the actualisation of its ontological essence, but precisely because social 
life constitutes itself in practice against this foundational lack (Esposito, 2009: 26-9). With 
Heidegger, Esposito argues that communitas can never be realised because paradoxically, it is 
always already given as “the condition, both singular and plural, of our complete existence” 
(Esposito, 2013: 36). Dasein is always Mitsein, and can only be experienced through the 
latter. 
The community isn't before or after society. It isn't what society has suppressed nor the goal that 
society has to place before itself. In the same way community isn't the result of a pact, of a will, or 
of a simple demand that is shared by individuals, nor is it the archaic site from which these 
individuals originate and then abandon for the simple fact that there are no individuals outside 
their being-in-a-common-world (Esposito, 2010: 92). 
The relational communitas emergent is anti-immunitarian in a two-fold sense. On the inside, 
it firstly exists as the shared, connective relations of communal munus which both break open 
and transcend physical, ethnic or political bodies. But this relational-practical grounding 
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secondly dissolves the community from the necessity to establish and ontologise clear-cut 
external boundaries through which “the community is walled in within itself and thus 
separated from the outside” (Esposito, 2010: 16). For the deconstruction of the ‘constitutive 
outside’ which this article attempts, it is important to note how Esposito’s communitas, which 
continues to exist not against an external other, but on the basis of a foundational void, 
challenges the epistemic necessity of the inside/outside antagonism set up by Laclau and 
Mouffe. But communitas cannot persist in practice. Exposing its members to the radical 
otherness and diversity of zoē, the relations of communitas can never reach social stability. 
The community must therefore immunise itself against the rupturing force internal to it 
(Esposito, 2013: 100-5; Esposito 2009: 32-6). It must transform the untamed life of zoē into a 
politically contained bios which charges communal relations without simultaneously 
threatening to disrupt them.  
For Esposito, immunity is thus on the one hand necessary to preserve communal Mitsein as 
the fundamental condition of our existence. Community, it seems, can in practice only persist 
as immunised through the philosophical myth of the proper community and its actualisation 
in biopolitical containment (Lemm, 2013). 
Clearly, without any kind of immunitary system, the world, just as an individual human body, 
could not bear up (Esposito, 2013: 133). 
[M]ore than the defensive apparatus superimposed on the community, immunization is its internal 
mechanism [ingranaggio]: the fold that in some way separates community from itself, sheltering 
it from an unbearable excess (Esposito, 2008: 52). 
But on the other hand, immunity problematically alters the logic of communal constitution. It 
replaces the relations of reciprocal expropriation with a centralised, political mechanism of 
identity-production as the ground of communal cohesion (Esposito, 2011: 6-7). In return for 
the protection of the communal bios, the shared obligation of munus is now transformed into 
a debt owed to the political sovereign who regulates and delimits individual life for the sake 
of social stability (Bird, 2013: 34-5).  
Esposito retraces how modern politics totalises and monopolises the immunitarian protection 
of the community’s body politic. The negative logic immunisation it unfolds displaces the 
internal threat of dissolution to the outside of the community, manifesting it as antagonistic 
other against which the community must be protected (Esposito, 2011: 48-60). Placed in the 
hands of the sovereign, the externalised threat of death is turned into a productive political 
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tool to preserve the immunised community by eliminating co-constituted others on its outside 
(Kordela, 2013: 167-70; Esposito, 2011: 114-8). But at the same time, political power also 
relies on this balancing management of life and death. The political guarantee of 
immunisation makes the community’s citizens indebted to the sovereign and legitimises the 
one-sided expropriation of their zoē (Esposito, 2010: 4-40). The genealogy of negative 
biopolitics which Esposito draws out in Bios hardly seems to differ from the oppressive, 
destructive and ultimately thanatopolitical governance of life theorised by Foucault, Derrida 
and Agamben (Campbell and Sitze, 2013: 122-30). Here, death is no longer the hidden core 
of immunitarian politics, but surfaces as the explicit object of political action. Once negative, 
extroversive immunisation reaches a certain threshold, it turns its deadly force against the 
community itself. As the constructive location of the threat to be eliminated, the community 
becomes the target of this auto-immunity, exemplified by the eugenic genocide of the Third 
Reich (Jaakko, 2013: 258-60; Esposito, 2008: 320-45).  
While communitas challenges the logic of the ‘constitutive other’, Esposito’s negative 
immunisation politically embraces it. But importantly, the co-constitution of community and 
external other is not inscribed as epistemological necessity on which the continuation of 
social relations relies. It is merely a contingent political form of the immunisation through 
which communal relations reproduce themselves against their foundational void. While 
immunisation seems necessary for Esposito, the externalising logic that binds the community 
to the other which is its displaced, internal void is the secondary product of communal 
politics. Moving beyond the externalising logic of negative immunisation, Esposito turns to 
Niklas Luhmann’s theory of self-producing systems to theorise immunity in a more open 
way. With Luhmann, he shows how immunity can be understood as introversive mechanism 
of “self-identification” (Esposito, 2011: 59) through which social-relations continuously 
reproduce themselves. This reproduction takes place in the absence of both an ontological 
ground and an epistemologically co-constituted other to replace it. Luhmann’s (2004: 476) 
immunity is tied and limited to existing social relations as locus of experience and therefore 
“gets along without knowledge of its environment”.  
Esposito replaces the constitutive self/other antagonism of negative immunisation with an 
open-ended, introversive balancing of inclusion and exclusion (Esposito, 2011: 8). While 
immunisation is a necessary condition for communal organisation, it does not have to take 
place as the construction of a particular other – or necessitate a constitutive antagonism at all. 
It reproduces the communal inside against an outside which is fundamentally indeterminate 
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and open to a multiplicity of secondary constructions. Immunity is thus freed from the 
political determination to “spill blood and is no longer covered in blood because there is 
nothing and no one outside it” (Esposito, 2011: 50). For this reason, Esposito argues that 
negative immunisation can be transformed into an affirmative biopolitics which recovers the 
productivity of differential relations of communitas.  
Instead of excluding others to reproduce political sovereignty, affirmative immunity 
embraces the multiplicity of its undefined outside as the productive force of Nietzsche’s 
eternal return (Esposito, 2008: 78-93). For Esposito, the communal body is a fluid, constantly 
evolving network of relations with the immune system as the driving force of this becoming. 
Rather than isolating a community from its respective environment, it allows for a constant 
connection to the Dionysian chaos of the latter as a resource for movement, regeneration and 
change (Esposito, 2011: 169-77). How affirmative immunisation can function affirmatively 
against the background of a foreign, unknown outside is, for Esposito, exemplified by the 
relationship between foetus and mother. Here, the immunity mechanisms of both organisms 
interact instead of forming an antagonism. Adapting to each other, they ultimately strengthen 
both biological systems. 
Far from being inactive, the immunity mechanism is working on a double front […]. In short, by 
immunizing the other, it is also immunizing itself. It immunizes itself from an excess of 
immunization. The fact that the entire operation is performed as part of the immune function 
activities— and not as a failure to act—is proved by the fact that the antibodies are still what 
block or “fool” the self-defense system of the mother […]. This means what allows to be 
preserved by the mother is not their “resemblance”, but rather their diversity transmitted 
hereditarily from the father. Only as a stranger can the child become ‘proper’ (Esposito, 2011: 
170). 
While Esposito’s argument here certainly seems to have ethical implications, he importantly 
grounds his tolerant immunity within the functional logic of microbiological theories of 
second-order immunity systems (Jerne, 1974: 373-87). These support the theoretical 
perspective which Esposito has already opened up with Luhmann: immunity primarily 
operates introversively and self-referentially rather than aggressively. In the absence of 
outside relations, (organic) systems develop immunity as a mechanism to uphold their 
internal relations as distinct from an outside which is fundamentally unknown. “[R]ather than 
acting as a barrier for selecting and excluding elements from the outside world, [immunity] 
acts as a sounding board for the presence of the world inside the self” (Esposito, 2011: 169).  
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It is for this reason, Esposito argues, that affirmative immunity produces tolerance for an 
outside whose ‘otherness’ is not constitutive and fixed, but the malleable construct of 
political immunisation itself. He insists that it is possible to re-wire the immunitarian 
intertwinement of life and politics towards a “biodemocracy” (Campbell and Luisetti, 2010, 
115). Esposito arguably remains rather vague with regard to the practical-political 
implementation of affirmative biopolitics. In Third Person he discusses linguistically and 
politically impersonal common spaces which escape the self/other dialectic as realms of 
biopolitical democracy (Esposito, 2012: 125-40). But regardless of the practicality of these 
suggestions, I argue that the innovative quality of Esposito’s immunity theory lies in the fact 
that it provides a perspective for post-ontological theory to understand community 
constitution without this foundational self/other dialectic. Esposito theorises an immunised 
community which persists as introversive construction against an unknown outside and does 
not emerge in necessary opposition to a ‘constitutive other’. The affirmatively immunised 
community is a spatial and temporal multiplicity of aggregated lives. Informed by Marcel 
Merlau-Ponty’s multiple flesh and Gilbert Simondon’s individuations, it dynamically 
transcends - and therefore resists - any static containment in the form of both a unitary body 
politic and its clearly defined outside (Kordela, 2013: 184-5; Esposito, 2008: 179).  
 
Organicism and Vitalism in Esposito: The Primacy of Life and the Question of Politics 
Esposito’s political immune system can grasp the suicidal dynamic of auto-immunity as 
political reality, but is never consumed by it. It dissolves the immunised community from the 
threat that negative biopolitics binds it to as ‘constitutive outside’ – and thus calls into 
question the political legitimacy of the sovereign protection which the former institutes. But 
how does this political application of immunity theory fit with Esposito’s own account of 
contemporary politics? The end of the Cold War with its structurally fixed realms of immune 
defence constitutes a fatal turning point for Esposito. As biopolitics is freed from all spatial 
confines, unhinged immunity mechanisms clash within the global political sphere, instituting 
a self-perpetuating “immunitary crisis” (Esposito, 2013: 62). Esposito shows how political 
power now unfolds through particular immunity events such as the US invasion of 
Afghanistan. These immunity events always involve both the governance of life and 
governance through death to constantly perpetuate the need for further immunisation. 
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The fact that in the recent Afghanistan war the same airplanes dropped bombs and food rations on 
the same populations is perhaps the most tangible sign of the nearly complete identity between the 
defense of life and the production of death (Esposito, 2013: 77). 
But peculiarly, Esposito doesn’t unpack these political events as emergent from the 
reproductive mechanism of immunisation which he has opened up theoretically. Applied to 
contemporary politics, immunitarian governance appears simplified. It is reduced to the mere 
Machiavellian deployment of sovereign force in exceptional circumstances. Esposito’s theory 
of life and politics as co-dependent, mutually constitutive dimensions of the immunised 
community is surprisingly and unfortunately far removed from his analysis of contemporary 
politics which is dominated by notions of structural determinism and political instrumentality. 
If contemporary politics is unhinged negative immunisation, how can we expose its 
contingency to initiate a political transformation to affirmative immunity? 
The peculiar separation which Esposito upholds between contemporary politics and a 
seemingly depoliticised affirmative immunity can be traced back to the latent organicism and 
political vitalism which run through his conceptualisation of biopolitical tolerance within the 
immunised community. Esposito’s argumentation, rapidly and without hesitation, shifts 
between references to immunity within his philosophy of life, the life of biological organisms 
and the politics of a community. Enfolding the vitalist primacy of life as well as biological 
essentialism in his argumentative development of political immunity, Esposito’s affirmative 
immunisation is firstly inconsistent with his critique of the body politic as catalysing 
antagonistic biopolitics (Deutscher, 2013: 58-63). It secondly calls into question the 
innovative achievements of his theory of fundamentally open, but politically conditioned 
immunisation which takes place against an undifferentiated outside. 
Expressed most clearly in his deconstructive reading of Hobbes’ Leviathan in both 
Communitas and Bios, Esposito’s theoretical project is a direct critique of organicism in legal 
and political thought (Esposito, 2010: 22-30; Esposito, 2008: 49-52). The modern 
“comingling of political and biomedical languages” (Esposito, 2013: 71) is both ground and 
symptom of the political logic of negative immunisation. Here, the citizens of the immunised 
community come into being as functionally subordinate organs of the sovereign body politic 
which absorbs their life force to maintain the cohesion of the politically constructed, 
communal bios (Lemm, 2013: 8-11; Hole, 2013: 114-6). 
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The subjects of modern politics may constitute themselves as such only by taking the place of the 
ancient sovereign that they killed. Yet, in devouring his body, they incorporate his very death. 
They can only assume power by dying themselves as subjects, by submitting themselves to death 
(Esposito, 2013: 31). 
But paradoxically, Esposito himself puts forward a theory of immunity - a biomedical term 
itself – which seems to perpetuate precisely the biologisation of thought which he sets out to 
deconstruct. Uncritically, he embraces the biomedical lexicon of immune tolerance, implants 
and prosthesis to develop his concept of affirmative immunity. In addition, Esposito refers to 
biological research, such as Jerne’s network theory, and medical examples of immunity to 
argue that the former can function productively rather than merely destructively (Tierney, 
2016: 65-72; Esposito, 2011: 166-70). This unaccounted turn in Esposito’s view on 
philosophical organicism is mirrored by his discussion of life. 
Initially, Esposito’s theory of immunity seems to align with Foucault’s epistemological 
relativisation of collective life as the politically charged product of particular historical and 
discursive conditions (Chomsky and Foucault, 2006: 5-6). In a genealogical fashion, Esposito 
(2008: 110-45; 2011: 52-79) reveals how life and the body are altered and controlled through 
the immunitarian biopower of sovereign politics, economy and theology. Explicitly, he 
proclaims that “there is no nature” (Esposito, 2011: 151; original italicisation). Esposito thus 
acknowledges that bios, individuated life, is malleable and subject to the grasp of discursive 
forces. But peculiarly, this does not seem to extend to the pre-communal life which manifests 
itself in all beings (Esposito, 2011: 148-69).  
As a Bergsonian, holistic force of becoming, Esposito endows this life with a status of 
ontological primacy:  “any thing [sic] that lives needs to be thought in the unity of life” 
(Esposito, 2008: 194). He develops his concept of life as a dynamic multiplicity which unites 
and drives all productions, repetitions and changes in relation to Nietzsche’s Dionysian drive, 
Gilbert Simondon’s theory of individuations and Spinoza’s holistic vitalism (Esposito, 2008: 
78-87; Gratton, 2013: 95-7). It is not accidental that this line-up of theoretical references 
shows a striking similarity to the sources which inspire Deleuze’s philosophy. Indeed, 
especially Deleuze’s late essay Immanence: A Life proves to be a central influence on 
Esposito’s attempt to think beyond a life enfolded in the immunitarian reproduction of 
sovereign politics. In the short essay, Deleuze describes life as a “pure stream of a-subjective 
consciousness, a pre-reflexive impersonal consciousness, a qualitative duration” (Deleuze, 
2011: 25). 
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The life of the individual gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life that releases a pure 
event freed from the accidents of internal and external life, that is, from the subjectivity and 
objectivity of what happens (Deleuze, 2001: 28). 
Esposito argues that in its singular, impersonal form, “A LIFE” (Deleuze, 2001: 27) precedes 
and thereby escapes the politically constructed antagonism between different individuations. 
Deleuze’s life is pure difference which can never be conceptualised as external other, but to 
which all secondary, dialectic oppositions are immanent. It thus provides additional support 
for Esposito’s theoretical move to dissociate the immunised community from its inherent 
antagonism to a ‘constitutive other’ and to explore how it alternatively can be formed in 
constant exchange with a differential, undefined outside - the outside of bare life (Esposito, 
2012: 134-37). But Esposito (2008: 185) goes further, proposing this ontology of “reciprocal 
immanence” as guiding principle for a biopolitical governance “that doesn’t subject life to the 
transcendence of a norm, but makes the norm the immanent impulse of life” (Esposito, 2008: 
194). 
It is debatable if those most Spinozist moments of Deleuze’s theory picked up and isolated by 
Esposito can be effectively integrated into a biopolitical perspective. But even disregarding 
this general concern, I argue that Esposito’s proposition to use life as an example for and 
source of political norms is considerably closer to a normative vitalism than Deleuzian 
philosophy provides the ground for. Immanence: A Life is not primarily concerned with 
developing a theory of life in its conventional understanding. It explores productivity as 
situated within life as an impersonal plane of immanence. Described by Deleuze and Guattari 
(1994: 65) as the “image of Thought-Being”, it is the source and space of human activity in 
which the distinction between organic-material and epistemic collapses (Zourabichvili, 2012: 
188-199). This suggests that Deleuzian immanence is not a suitable ground to establish the 
ontological primacy or superiority of material-biological becoming over conceptual-epistemic 
productivity.  
For this reason, Esposito’s attempt to use Deleuze’s philosophy - designed to subvert the 
notions of origin and linearity (Zourabichvili, 2012: 36-40) – to ground politics in a 
normative vitalism appears misguided. But even more problematically, Esposito occasionally 
seems to equate the open-ended movement of Deleuzian becoming with the scientific 
representation of biological life. In Third Person, he adopts Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of 
becoming-animal designed to resist the dogmatism of subject-centred, representative 
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philosophy. But Esposito employs the concept in a direct, seemingly literal sense as the 
political demand for the return to a natural, dynamic state of communal life. 
Becoming-animal, for Deleuze, […] is our most tangible reality, so long as what we mean by real 
is the process of mutation that our nature has always undergone. What we are talking about is not 
humankind’s alter, or the alter in humankind, but rather humankind brought back to its natural 
alteration (Esposito, 2012: 150). 
This tendency to essentialise biological life in order to deduct socio-political propositions 
also becomes visible in Esposito’s reference to living organisms and organic matter. As stated 
above, he uses divergent theoretical conceptions of living matter from Merlau-Ponty’s flesh 
to Donna Haraway’s cellular multiplicity to work out the immunitarian constructedness of 
biological categories (Esposito, 2011: 106-21; 145-7). However, Esposito does not seem to 
drive at the general contingency of different ways to account for life. By contrast, he 
deconstructs these categories in order to reveal the biological, cellular multiplicity of the flesh 
as the essence of bare, uncontained life endowed with a superior truth (Chiesa, 2011: 108-9; 
Gratton, 2013: 92-3).  
This is most striking in Esposito’s (2011: 170) reference to the example of the immunitarian 
interaction between mother and foetus where the simultaneous duality of progressive 
difference and common belonging - under conditions regulated by life itself - allows for 
immunity to produce tolerance and affirmation, not hostility (Deutscher, 2013: 59-60). 
Tolerant immunity, which Esposito offers as a political alternative to the antagonism of 
negative immunisation, is here problematically inferred from a biological process where 
immunity remains bound to a pre-existent, binary organic difference. For the immune system 
of the mother to adapt during pregnancy, Esposito (2011: 170) states that the child needs to 
have a certain “degree of genetic foreignness of the father” not to be identified as a threat. 
Here, the essential difference of the ‘other’ is clearly more than the contingent product of 
immunisation – it is the necessary condition for its affirmative functioning.  
The latent organicism and vitalism present in Esposito’s theory of immunity reveals a 
problematic, unreflected slip in the status of organic metaphors and examples from his 
deconstructive critique of the antagonising biologism of modern politics to its affirmative 
reversal. But could Esposito’s continuation of philosophical organicism and vitalism be the 
conscious, consequential theoretical response to a present socio-political context which he 
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describes as thoroughly steeped in the biopolitical dialectic of negative immunisation 
(Deutscher, 2013: 60-2; Esposito, 2013: 75)? 
To these apparatuses I contrasted not something from the outside but their exact opposite: a 
conception of a norm that is immanent to bodies, not imposed upon them from outside, a break 
with the closed and organic idea of a political body in favor of the multiplicity of “flesh of the 
world,” and finally a politics of birth understood as the continual production of difference in terms 
of identity (Esposito, 2013: 78).  
Understood in this sense, Esposito’s theorisation of affirmative immunity would be the 
attempt at an incremental, subversive alteration of the immunitarian political mechanism, 
careful not to fall victim to the logic of the ‘constitutive other’ by formulating resistance 
‘from the outside’. However, even within this logic, Esposito’s vitalism remains problematic 
because of the ontological status he attributes to his biologically informed account of life. 
Deduced from a particular philosophical concept of ontologically anchored life – and posited 
as necessary political consequence of the former – Esposito’s affirmative immunity seems to 
replicate and perpetuate rather than change the constitutive logic of the immunised 
community. It theoretically institutes a ground for communal life which is more profound 
than the social relations of the shared munus.  
It has been shown how Espoito’s ontologisation of life can firstly be challenged for it its 
inconsistency with the more deconstructive, post-ontological moments of his philosophy. 
Problematically, this inconsistency subverts Esposito’s deconstruction of communal 
constitution as bound to a self/other relation. Since differential life - as the outside of politics 
– is identified as the essential property of concrete biological entities, Esposito’s theory falls 
back to grounding affirmative biopolitics in the idea of an original self capable of tolerating a 
foreign other. As a consequence of Esposito’s vitalist prioritisation of life, the practical-
political implications of immunity secondly remain underdeveloped. As shown above, 
Esposito provides no points of contact for a theoretical or practical reworking of negative, 
thanatopolitical immunity in political practice (Esposito, 2013: 55-8; Esposito, 2010: 62-4). 
In Bios, Esposito (2008: 173-92) begins to develop affirmative immunity as political 
alternative to the sovereign oppression of shared life – but only, it seems, to overcome 
politics altogether. Once the force of life is unleashed, intrinsically endowed with a positive 
direction, politics is reduced to a secondary, reactive function.  
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It only needs to follow and implement the norms purported by the force of life itself. Through 
his reading of Spinoza4, Esposito (2008: 188) “configures the juridical order as meta-stable 
system of reciprocal contaminations in which the juridical norm, rooted in the biological 
norm, reproduces the latter’s mutations”. In his vitalist turn, Esposito loses sight of the 
necessary connection between social coexistence and immunitarian politics which he draws 
out in his theory of community. How communal immunisation plays out in its concrete 
political-institutional dimensions, once it is no longer functionally directed towards an 
externalised other, remains unspecified in favour of an “afﬁrmative and vitalist account of the 
constant transformation of an entity’s own norm” (Deutscher, 2013: 62). In sum, it is the 
ontologisation of Esposito’s theoretically unmediated bio-medical references which is 
essentially problematic for his deconstruction of the ‘constitutive other’ – and which will be 
revealed as radically different from the way Luhmann employs the neuro-biological concept 
of autopoiesis. As pointedly summarised by Lorenzo Chiesa (2011: 108), 
Esposito’s intention to investigate biopolitics, beyond Foucault, as an immanent nexus in which 
and for which life and politics are – and have always been – inextricable from one another is thus 
compromised by his own transcendent stance on life. 
 
Towards a Theory of Autopoietic Immunity with Niklas Luhmann 
The third part of this article draws on Niklas Luhmann’s sociological Systems Theory to 
firstly resolve the ontological ambiguities which Esposito’s vitalism enfolds in his 
introversive, immunitarian production of social relations. Secondly, the theoretical reliance 
on the self/other dialectic as constitutive ground of social cohesion is further problematised 
through Luhmann in a way which thirdly re-focuses immunity theory on the realm of politics. 
While Esposito turns to Luhmann to develop his introversive immunisation, Luhmann’s 
theory of social systems is usually associated with mechanistic-structuralist and analytical 
social research. Its employment within a critical, biopolitical theory might therefore appear at 
best surprising, at worst ill fitted. Against this dominant classification of Luhmann’s theory, 
this article ties in with recent attempts to make use of his ideas within the framework of post-
structuralist thought. What Luhmann’s conceptualisation of society as a system of meaning 
relations comprised of other, epistemologically autonomous meaning systems such as 
 
4 A critical analysis of Esposito’s eclectic use of Spinoza’s philosophy similar to the discussion of his reading of 
Deleuze undertaken here can be found in Gratton (2013). 
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economy or politics offers is, as Hans-Georg Moeller puts it, is a genuinely radical - “meta-
critical” (2012: 31) – perspective to challenge the hidden humanist and anthropocentric core 
of many left-wing theories. “Luhmann, in a fashion similar to Copernicus, Darwin, and 
Freud, shatters some of the ‘common sense’ self-descriptions so that previously unimagined 
possibilities of looking at the world can emerge” (Moeller, 2012: 31).  
One of the post-humanist, theoretical innovations most essential to Luhmann’s theory is its 
focus on processes of autopoiesis. Autopoiesis specifies Luhmann’s earlier concept of self-
reference: an autopoietic system produces not only its structures, but also the events which 
are connected to these structures to ensure continuous reproduction in a way which is 
completely closed off from the systemic outside (Luhmann, 1995: 34-45). Luhmann adopts 
the concept of autopoiesis from the constructivist neuro-biological research of Humberto 
Maturana and Francisco Varela (Sciulli, 1994: 41-2). Against the view that bodies form 
singular neuronal units centrally regulated by the brain, the research of Maturana and Varela 
(1980: 8-12) indicates that each organism consists in a multiplicity of organic systems which 
all perform their own, independent neuronal interpretations. Life, in this sense, is the self-
production of multiple neuronal networks which form living entities through continuous, but 
ultimately contingent connections on their systemic inside (Maturana and Varela, 1980: 62-
5). Luhmann transfers Maturana and Varela’s notion of autopoiesis to the production of 
social life. As autopoietic entities, social systems differentiate themselves in a non-
teleological, strictly functional way (Devellennes, 2014: 9-10).  
Autopoiesis ensures the continuity of social relations, but it is completely indeterminate in 
terms of the social content and structures reproduced, “sovereign with respect to the 
constitution of identities and differences” (Luhmann, 1990: 3). At a first glance, Luhmann’s 
adoption of autopoiesis from Maturana and Varela’s neuro-biological research appears to fall 
victim to the same organicism which Esposito fails to detach himself from. However, the idea 
of autopoiesis is radically altered – and dissolved from any biological-vitalist connotations - 
when introduced to the context of Luhmann’s social theory. In contrast to Esposito’s vitalist 
life, autopoiesis does not oppress or fosters evolutionary becoming. Open in a radical sense, 
autopoiesis neither ontologically nor normatively distinguishes between stability and change 
– not even with regard to the notion of biological life itself As Luhmann remarks in his 
characteristically dry tone: “Autopoiesis is no guarantee for survival, let alone a formula for 
progress”, even though admitting that “[t]he evolutionary one-off invention of life has proved 
remarkably stable” (Luhmann, 2004: 466).  
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In contrast to the relations of communitas directing affirmative immunity, the autopoiesis of 
social systems is not only more open, but also does not require reciprocal expropriation. It 
consists in the constant provision of communicative connectivity, the possibility to make 
sense of and respond to events, actions and information within the system-internal logic of 
meaning (Luhmann, 1990: 2-5). All autopoietic entities are hence functionally – 
epistemologically - closed. They persist by maintaining the difference of their meaning 
system against the pure complexity or informational noise of an outside which cannot be 
conceptualised, let alone be grasped by the system. In contrast to classical cybernetic theory, 
Luhmann’s social systems do not exist as ontologically pre-given, unitary entities (Moeller, 
2012: 112-31). Like communitas, a social system is nothing but the contingent, manifest 
relations which emerge and reproduce themselves in the absence of any ontological 
foundation or essence (Luhmann, 1995: 70-6). Both the community and the social system are 
thus fundamentally paradoxical. Always already “given even before we place the lens in front 
of us” (Esposito, 2013: 90), they constitute themselves against the foundational void which is 
their absent origin.  
Both system and communitas reproduce themselves as social-epistemic relations with 
temporal continuity in a way that is conditioned by – and limited to the inside of - those 
manifest social relations as horizon of experience, knowledge and meaning production 
(Stäheli, 2000: 82-92). But on this shared basis, Luhmann’s concept of autopoiesis much 
more radically abandons any attempts to ground those introversive constructions from an 
Archimedian point detached from the social-relational ground of observation. Instead, 
Luhmann introduces a system-phenomenological perspectivism which epistemologically 
totalises the systemic inside (Moeller, 2012: 80-6). 
[I]f the elements that compose a system are constituted as units by the system itself […], there is 
no fundamental common ground among systems. Whatever functions as a unit cannot be observed 
from outside, only inferred. […] No system can decompose another analytically to arrive at final 
elements (substances) in which knowledge could find an ultimate foothold and secure 
correspondence with its object (Luhmann, 1995: 35). 
With regard to the outside of the system, this means that it also is produced contingently 
through internal operations - irrespective of any possible, ontological existence this outside 
contains, which can never be accessed as such from the systemic inside. Even when attributed 
to the outside of the system, all information is produced by the system itself – and contingent 
on its particular logic of meaning (Luhmann, 1995: 68). In this sense systems “‘choose’ the 
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elements of their environment that affect them” (Devellennes, 2014: 11). But constituent for 
the system and its autopoiesis is not the particular way in which the outside is internally made 
sense of and related to the systemic identity. For Luhmann, it rather is the continuous 
differentiation of social relations from the external complexity which ensures the duration of 
the system. As a consequence, “one can say that the system totalises itself by referring to the 
environment and by leaving it undetermined. The environment is simply ‘everything else’” 
(Luhmann, 1995: 181). The self-totalisation of the systemic inside in Luhmann now 
epistemologically completes the deconstruction of the constitutive self/other dialectic which 
Esposito theoretically initiates, but leaves incomplete on the inconsistent ground of his 
vitalist depth ontology. The radically closed perspectivism of Luhmann’s meaning systems 
excludes the possibility of a constitutive externality and thus frees social relations from the 
epistemological antagonism that institutes political hostility.  
But which role does immunisation play for the reproduction of an entity against the outside of 
pure complexity? How can Luhmann provide novel insights to the practical-political 
implications of constitutive openness which are left unexplored in Esposito? To understand 
immunity in its political function in Luhmann, it is necessary to unpack how social meaning 
relations are continuously produced through the oscillation between the incomprehensible 
outside and the inside of reduced complexity. Retracing the history of Western social 
organisation from primitive to feudal and contemporary society, Luhmann identifies an 
increasing tendency towards structuration and specification. Gradually, vertical hierarchies 
have been replaced by functionally differentiated systems. Centred on a particular social 
function – economic, educational or political – these systems have closed themselves off 
from the external complexity of other social realms in order to master the increasingly 
demanding, internal tasks they face within contemporary, highly developed society 
(Luhmann, 2002: 69-76).  
But as a consequence, the increased system-internal complexity now exhausts the connective 
capacity of the social system. A re-exposure to the higher complexity of the outside, which it 
no longer can make sense of, would lead to the break-down of meaning connectivity - and 
thus the termination of the system. Now, the system needs an immunity mechanism to 
constantly keep at bay the external complexity against which it differentiates itself 
(Luhmann, 2004: 383-4). But immunisation also needs to target the internally increasing 
entropy of meaning within self-observing systems. Recording previous decisions, alternative 
options and situational assessments, they constantly produce new information to be 
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processed5. This constant alteration of the decisional ground leads to a general “insecurity of 
the connective value of events” (Luhmann, 1995: 368) which puts the duration of the system 
at risk.  
Immunity is, for Luhmann (2004: 384), a “function of the social system in relation to a 
problem, which arises with the structural coupling of this system with its environment”. It 
must manage the ambiguities, meaning contradictions and conflicts which follow from the 
system’s exposure to complexity and threaten the duration of its relations6 (Luhmann, 2002: 
400-6). Luhmann does not provide a more specific definition for his concept of immunity. 
But linked back to the paradoxical groundlessness that the system shares with Esposito’s 
communitas, it becomes clear that his immunisation is a mechanism of deparadoxification. 
Just as Esposito’s community must immunise itself against the threatening void at its core, 
Luhmann’s social system must differentiate itself from the informational noise which is the 
unknown outside, but at the same time the hidden ground of its duration. For Luhmann, 
immunisation hence on the one hand needs to function as a selective, epistemic boundary, 
protecting the system from the complexity surrounding it. On the other hand, it is as a 
mechanism of temporal-serial ordering which produces a manageable set of alternative 
meanings to “bridge the before/after difference” (Luhmann, 1995: 296) and ensure the 
connective duration of social relations. 
In Esposito, the communal need for immunisation creates a governmental vacuum which 
allows the sovereign to reproduce its legitimacy by protecting the community against the 
other it politically constructs. Luhmann assumes that all autopoietic systems have available 
specific mechanisms to manage meaning insecurities. However, within the context of a 
functionally differentiated society, the resolution of contradictions and ambiguities through 
collectively steering decisions is the specific function of the political system (Luhmann, 
2002: 140-54). To persist autopoietically with its institutional structures and actors, the 
political system constantly needs to “hold ready the capacity for collectively binding 
decision-making” (Luhmann, 2002: 84; own translation). But the political authority of 
 
5 Social meaning systems are “non-trivial machines” (Luhmann, 1990: 275) which observe what they perceive 
as environment as well as themselves. Like the auto-pilot of a plane, they integrate their own changing position 
as the outcome of previous decisions into the knowledge basis which conditions new connective decisions. This 
constant re-entry of previous decisions increases the system-internal complexity. 
6 Esposito mentions the immunising force of contradictions in his discussion of Luhmann’s theory in Immunitas, 
but fails to ground them in their relation to complexity and indetermination. He rather seems to view 
contradictions as examples of negative immunisation, the balancing of order and conflict which ultimately 
subjects the whole community to preventive biopolitical control (Esposito, 2011: 48-51). 
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decision-making faces a fundamental difficulty. To fulfil its functional role, it must expose 
itself to the external complexity of other – economic, scientific or legal - meaning systems 
which it cannot comprehend, and internally process this complexity to produce the decisions 
required7. Immunisation is thus of particular, functional relevance for the political system. It 
ensures that connective political decisions can be made under conditions which make it 
impossible for the political system to have secure knowledge about the systemic contexts it 
decides on (Rasch and Wolfe, 2000: 25-8)8.  
Luhmann’s political management of contradictions, emergent between expectations and 
events, information and action, or different connective meaning options under the conditions 
of high complexity functions within the pharmacological logic characteristic for 
immunisation (Luhmann, 2004: 475-7). Distorting the secure ground for decisions, 
contradictions threaten political and social connectivity. But at the same time, they allow for 
the resolution of this decisional insecurity - taken to the extreme, their logic is reversed. 
Contradictions which are experienced as threatening by society as a whole constitute alarms 
signals learned and historically incorporated by the political system. But when a contradiction 
unfolds a particular, alarming meaning, it also opens up a political path of (re-)action 
solidified by past experiences. The contradiction reduces complexity and turns the condensed 
insecurity into “something almost secure: something has to happen in order to solve the 
contradiction” (Luhmann, 1995: 371). While contradictions which pass this threshold to 
signify an alarming threat provide points of contact to allow for the reproduction of the 
political system in its functional unity, they don’t necessarily reproduce the political status 
quo they result from. As alarm signals, they introduce “a fictionalized, secondary 
indeterminacy” (Luhmann, 1995: 361) to the political realm which allows for the internal 
change necessary to resolve critical, insecurity-inducing conditions. 
One can clearly see how contradictions fulfill their function of warning and alarming. For an 
instant they destroy the system’s total pretension to being ordered, reduced complexity. For an 
instant, then, indeterminate complexity is restored, and everything is possible. But at the same 
 
7 Since the political system can only understand information and act accordingly within the boundaries of its 
internal meaning, effective political steering that alters the structures and dynamics of the social entity addressed 
is unlikely. This however doesn’t affect the reproductive effect of political responses for the political system as 
a functional entity. The former only requires the production of political responses as such and is independent 
from the reproduction of a particular content, e.g. a certain party in power (Luhmann, 1990: 165-74). 
8 As noted by Opitz (2013), the emphasis on the self-productive nature of governance and its fundamental 
contingency reveals similarities to Foucault’s governmentality. Important differences are however Luhmann’s 
continued focus on institutional-political structures and his emphasis on the fundamental instability of political 
production in terms of the structures and elements reproduced. 
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time contradictions possess enough form to guarantee the connectivity of communicative 
processing via meaning. The system’s reproduction is merely directed into different paths 
(Luhmann, 1995: 373; original italicisation). 
Within meaning-based social systems, contradictions and the political responses which 
follow must be understood as epistemological events. Reminiscent of Agamben’s (1998: 8-
12) state of exception, these events certainly can be instrumentally used by sovereign power 
to actualise or extend the legitimacy of governmental actions. However, in contrast to 
Agamben, Luhmann emphasises that neither the emergence of contradictions nor the political 
potentiality they unfold can be intentionally constructed or politically controlled. Luhmann’s 
thoroughly political immunisation thus calls into question the diametrical opposition between 
negative, sovereign biopolitics and tolerant immunisation which Esposito develops. Luhmann 
explores how the immunisation of modern politics which epistemologically governs the 
demarcation between inside and outside, complexity and its resolution in meaning, 
necessarily opens up a space of political potentiality.  
Equally open to change and identical reproduction, this immunisation however does not, as 
Esposito argues, automatically produce tolerance. Following Luhmann, the social system as a 
whole possesses a number of mechanisms to structure and stabilise expectations inter-
systemically and reduce the necessity for political decision-making. He names truth, ethics 
and law as examples, discussing the latter as society’s main immunity mechanism in more 
detail. In Law as a Social System, Luhmann argues that the modern diffusion of (formerly 
immunising) normative bindings increases the chance of clashes in expectations and actions 
which produce contradictions and thus connective insecurity. The functionally differentiated 
legal system integrates conflicts in a controlled way and keeps them separate from the 
political realm. It produces secure resolutions which, even though fundamentally contingent, 
are legitimised by system-internal path-dependencies (Luhmann, 2004: 171-80). Luhmann’s 
immunising legal system constitutes a powerful argument against the necessary link of self-
reflective, introversive immunity and adaptive tolerance established by Esposito. It operates 
in close relation to – and possibly in support of – sovereign governance which is immunised 
from the need to absorb further contradictions.  
The legal system does not connect the political system to its social outside but, on the 
contrary, immunises the former from the necessity to adapt to its surroundings. “The demand 
for an immune system is not the result of poor adaption to the environment but is a result of 
giving adaption a miss, in other words avoiding it” (Luhmann, 2004: 477). As Luhmann 
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(2004: 472-3; 2002: 294-8) illustrates, the meaning output produced by both legal and 
political system is largely independent from the normative and structural restrictions of other 
social realms – but also from their requirements and demands. Yet, since Luhmann’s 
immunity works in the complete absence of ontological anchoring, the strict, regulatory way 
in which political immunity mechanisms resolve conflicts is in itself fundamentally 
contingent – and hence open to change. Through Luhmann, negative and affirmative 
immunisation move closer together. But the political openness which comes with a turn to 
introversive immunity is no longer guaranteed to unfold affirmative effects through an 
intrinsic alignment with the force of life, as it is the case in Esposito. Instead, affirmative 
immunity is made immanent to the horizon of theoretical and political emergence that is 
spanned by the social relations of the community. 
 
Conclusion: The Politics of the Undifferentiated Constitutive Outside 
Employing Esposito’s and Luhmann’s theories of immunity, this article has theorised the 
‘constitutive outside’ of communal identity construction in a way which is epistemologically 
freed from the political antagonism Laclau and Mouffe bind it to. Esposito’s deconstruction 
of the ‘constitutive other’ through communitas is completed when his theory of immunity is 
untied it from its self-inflicted, vitalist limitations through Luhmann. With Luhmann, I 
suggest thinking both the immunised community and the sovereign politics which governs it 
as autopoietically constructed, relational entities intertwined in a dynamic of reciprocal 
reproduction. Completely indeterminate in terms of both the content of internal, communal 
relations and the way their outside is perceived, the autopoietic community appears as a 
suitable epistemic ground for the new commons designed to transcend humanist atavisms and 
the Anthropocene which Esposito develops in his latest writings.  
Epistemologically radicalised through Luhmann, the relations of Esposito’s community can 
be explored in their practical existence in the absence of ontological grounding and 
normative-teleological directionality. Together, both theories unfold a constructivist 
pragmatism which is capable to address the manifest reality of the communal relations 
observed without losing sight of the fact that “their very reality is an immanent effect of 
contingent social construction” (Moeller, 2012: 117). Even beyond the link to Esposito 
established here, I believe that this radical, but practice-oriented post-ontological move 
reveals Luhmann’s theory as a fruitful resource for contemporary post-structuralist thought. 
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Through Luhmann’s autopoiesis, the deterministic, biological-vitalist force of becoming 
which grounds Esposito’s immunised community is replaced with a process of contingent, 
non-directional social differentiation. This dissociation of bio-political theory from the notion 
of life might seem paradoxical, especially in the context of Italian Theory whose particular 
character, for Esposito, “lies precisely in the centrality of the category of ‘life’” (Campbell 
and Luisetti, 2010: 109).  
On the one hand, it certainly calls into question the ethical notions invoked by Esposito’s 
affirmative immunity as realm of agonistic conflict which produces mutual tolerance. An 
autopoietically closed-off entity can never be mindful of and tolerant towards a foreign 
interpretative logic to which it has no access. But on the other hand, the turn towards a 
completely indeterminate autopoiesis subverts the opposition between negative and 
affirmative immunity. In this sense, contemporary politics is brought closer to an affirmative 
immunity, connected to the former through a more flexible route of transition than Esposito’s 
theory allows for. With Luhmann, self-reflexive immunity does not need to overturn 
destructive thanatopolitics focused on an external other – it is already the underlying logic 
which guides the immunitarian intertwinement of community and politics. Autopoiesis, 
contrary to life, does not need to be freed from the confines of politics. Politics is always 
already subject to its self-reproductive logic, and changes according to its mode of 
functioning. 
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